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Ideological Conflicts
in Early American Books
by Clarence H. Faust

The following is an address given by Dr. Clarence H. Faust at the 1957
Syracuse University Scholastic Achievement Dinner. Almost twenty years
later, when we are celebrating the bicentennial anniversary of our country, it
seems important to review the conflicts inherent in the American expression
ofdemocracy which are so clearly outlined by the late Dr. Faust.
"This address was first printed in 1958 as a souvenir book by the Syracuse
University Press, which has courteously granted permission to reprint it here.
Then Chancellor of Syracuse University William P. Tolley wrote in his
introduction to that booklet:
"Dr. Faust is a gifted teacher who for many years added lustre to the
Department of English at the University of Chicago. He is also a skillful
administrator with long experience as Dean of the College and Dean of the
Graduate School of Library Science at the University ofChicago; and later as
Director of Libraries, Dean of Humanities and Sciences and Acting President
at Stanford University. He was elected President of the Fund for the
Advancement of Education in 1951, and [was, for a time,] Vice President
of the Ford Foundation. A deep concern for problems of higher education
and imaginative leadership in educational administration have not lessened his
interest in more specialized studies. His volume, with Professor [Thomas E.]
Johnson, on Jonathan Edwards is still the most useful annotated collection of
the works of that important figure. In 1954 he published a major
contribution to American Studies, The Decline of Puritanism."
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pleasure to be present at the significant cluster
of events at Syracuse University during these two days-the
dedication of a great collection of books, the Annual Scholastic
Achievement Dinner, and the opening of the new offices of the
University Press. These events, taken together, have a striking
symbolic significance. They symbolize the essence of the University, the fact that its activities center in, revolve around, and
exist for the life of the mind. The intellectual life of the University has three aspects-the inheritance of ideas, the study and
discussion of them, and their dissemination. Thus the University's
collection of books, the intellectual work of its faculty and students, and publication are the chief facets of its central concern
with knowledge.
The critical element in this triad is, of course, the activities of
scholars and students-the work in libraries, classrooms, and laboratories where ideas are examined, discussed, and clarified. The
very life of a university is threatened by anything which checks
the full and free and open and constant discussion and examination of ideas. In our day, universities stand in some dangerand so consequently does the society universities serve-that as
a result of external pressures or of internal loss of confidence
freedom of discussion will decline. The threat is, of course, not
new to this generation, and perhaps we shall understand it more
fully and have better insights about how to deal with it if we
trace the historical roo~ of the current anti-intellectualism to the
period of our national birth, the eighteenth century.
The ideas and institutions of the eighteenth century have inevitably persisted, however modified in form, into the twentieth.

I

T IS A VERY GREAT
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There is much to be said for the analogy on which Edmund
Burke insisted in his Reflections on the French Revolution, namely, that we inherit our political principles and institutions from
our forebears as we receive from them opr lives and our propeny.
One side of this inheritance, the great democratic institutions and
ideas which have come down to us from our eighteenth-century
forefathers, is frequently stressed. Its other side, especially certain
conflicts of theory which still trouble us, is much less often, in
fact very rarely, considered.
It is perfectly clear that we owe the form of government under
which we live and the freedoms we enjoy as a people to the wise
and courageous men who conceived and brought fonh upon this
continent a new nation, under a new form of government, a political society without a succession of crowned monarchs or a
hereditary aristocracy-a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people. And we inherited from the Founding
Fathers much more than a machinery of government. We are
indebted to them for a clear formulation of the principles on
which such a government could be justified and its scope and
purposes determined.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident," wrote the framers of
the Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with cenain unalienable
rights; and that among these are life, libeny, and the pursuit of
happiness." I take it that these words were intended to be more
than merely mouth-filling and ear-tingling phrases. And I take
it as the sign of a deep malady in our contemporary life, to which
I should like to turn our attention tonight, that many of ~ would
be inclined to grant, if challenged to defend what Jefferson called
self-evident truths, that these words cannot be taken literally, but
must be regarded as the kind of rhetorical flag which a political
pany always waves over the position it wishes to occupy.
To say that Jefferson meant what he said in calling these propositions about the equality of man self-evident truths and that
21

he was here speaking not for himself alone but for the majority
of his fellow citizens, on whose behalf the declaration of our independence from Great Britain was written, is not to say that
the Founding Fathers were unanimous in their political philosophies. They were divided by deep religious differences-Protestant, Catholic, and the anti-clerical and anti-ecclesiastical Deist.
There were deep philosophical differences among them as respects the nature of man, whether primarily good or evil, whether
or not possessed of freedom of will. There were, furthermore,
sharp differences of interests, especially those which .~et the agrarian sections of the country in opposition to the mercantilist areas.
In the framing of our Constitution, these differences created such
serious difficulties that as one member of the Constitutional Convention of 1789 put it, representatives of the various states were
often held together in their discussions by "a hair" and the dissolution of the Convention and the consequent collapse of its
work were an almost daily expectation.
We are the inheritors not only of the tremendous positive
benefits of the American form of government and of the enunciation of principles which justify and govern its operation, but
also of the conflicts of interests and ideas in Colonial America. It
is my thesis tonight that some of the difficulties we have inherited
threaten now, perhaps even more seriously than they did in the
eighteenth century, the healthy continuation of the way of life
and government which has been developed in America.
The difficulties presented by the religious and philosophical diversity of the eighteenth century and by the sharp clash of the
interest groups then affecting political life were resolved by two
important means when our Constitution was framed. The first of
these was the wise recognition by the Founding Fathers that
agreements concerning courses of action might be reached by
people holding quite different theoretical positions. The second
was the confidence of our political forebears in the effectiveness
of sustained, rational discussion among people who disagree.
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Our Constitution would never have been formulated if its
framers had insisted upon complete unanimity in a philosophy of
government as a prerequisite to agreement about the nature of
the political institutions and the modes.of operations of these institutions for the country. The Constitutional Convention focused attention, therefore, upon the structure of government and
upon the rules of it,s operation. Thus men who held different
views about the proper relationships of agriculture and industry,
about the loyalty to state governments as over against loyalty to
a national one, and even about the political status of the Negro
were able, despite these differences, to agree upon a government
of three branches, on the modes of election or appointment of
officers in these various branches, on the terms of office in each
case, on the spheres of authority of the executive, judicial, and
legislative arms of government, and on the scopes of authority of
state and national governmental institutions. The concentration
of the Founding Fathers upon the form and operation of government has given this country the incalculable benefit of an instrument to preserve peace without requiring absolute unanimity or
conformity in the areas of ideas and thought.
We are so accustomed to the situation we have inherited from
our eighteenth-century framers -of government that we tend to
forget how amazing their achievement was. Its results are to be
seen in every presidential election. Two parties which through
the campaign have seemed bitterly opposed at the level of ideastwo massive groups ardently convinced of the rightness of their
position, each viewing with alarm the ideas of its opponents, and
pushing its candidates as though the life of the country depended
upon their election-will, when the machinery of the election has
completed its operation, unite peacefully under the leadership of
the winner. The losing candidate does not muster his supporters
for a revolution. Instead he sends a telegram of congratulations
and assurances of support to his successful opponent. And the
winning candidate feels no need to protect himself by literal or
23

figurative execution of his opponents. We have, in short, learned
that men who disagree strongly on very important questions can
live together in peace. I shall want in a moment to come to certain
hazards in this arrangement, which I merely mention here; namely, the tolerance of differences of opinion may lead to indifference
about ideas and thus in a subtle way undermine the principles
which constitute the foundations of our political society.
The second resource, as the Founding Fathers saw it, for handling disagreements without concentration camps or thought control was freedom of discussion. Freedom of discussion in America
rested not upon contempt for ideas but upon confidence in the
power of ideas. In his great pronouncement of freedom of speech,
the Areopagitica, John Milton took a position to which eighteenthcentury leaders of American thought came to adhere and he put
the case in words which have been reiterated through the centuries: "So long as truth be in the field," he said, "we do her injustice in suppressing freedom of expression." What Milton and
later our forefathers had in mind was not that in the din of conflicting opinions truth would by some magic speak in the clearest
and loudest voice, but rather that in sustained and systematic
discussion of opposing points of view, error would be discovered
and truth would emerge and be consolidated. As they saw it, the
advancement of truth by free discussion of ideas was not an automatic or even an easy process. They had no confidence, I am
sure, that in the mere announcement of conflicting propositions
those which were true would at a glance seem obviously right.
They placed their confidence in rational discourse-in the rigorous
statement not merely of conclusions but of premises and connections of thought. In this process, the partial errors of half
truths would to some extent be pruned away, inadequate statements of truth would be reshaped to bring words and ideas into
some greater harmony with the real nature of things, and contradictions and inconsistencies would be resolved in slow and
painful steps toward truth.
24

One of our gravest dangers today-perhaps the most serious
that our democracy faces-is the increase of doubts about the
effectiveness of reasoned and reasonable discourse-doubts, indeed, that the kind of progress toward truth on which the best
tradition of Western culture placed its confidence can be truly
realized.
Now the roots of these doubts lie, as I see it, as firmly in the
soil of the eighteenth century as do the roots of our government
and the principles of which it is the flower. Our doubts are as
firmly rooted in the eighteenth century as our beliefs. I should
like to uncover three roots of our doubts about reasoned discourse
in the hope that the examination of them may suggest how our
confidence in such discourse may be recovered. For unless we
can recover that confidence and learn to act upon it effectively,
we must resign ourselves to the effects of propaganda and ultimately of physical force. If reasoned and reasonable thought and
discourse are repudiated, or disdained, or neglected, they will
inevitably be replaced Dy emotion and propaganda, and eventually the conflict of emotion and propaganda must be resolved by
physical violence. Each of the early sources of our distrust of
reasoned discourse was originally an aspect of a theory of the
role of reason in human affairs, and out of three views of that
role and the strains of thought in America of which they were
parts, a formidable cluster of distrust of rational discourse has
been formed.
One of these strains in American thought is exemplified in the
works of Tom Paine whose pronouncements in favor of separation from the mother country were perhaps the most important
single incitement of the Revolution. As even John Adams who
had no sympathy with Paine's religious position and very little
for his political theories put it, Tom Paine's Common Sense made
the bells of the thirteen colonies ring together. Tom Paine's position was a simple and persuasive one. He appealed to common
sense, meaning not what we generally designate by the term,
25

namely, the practical.ideas of practical people, but rather those
general ideas of right and wrong, of justice and injustice, which
are common to all men-even, as he put it, to those of the meanest
capacities. A typical appeal to common sense in Paine's use of
the term is his argument that government must either rise out
of the people or be imposed upon the people, that imposition of
rule upon people is tyranny, and that consequently all governments not established by the consent of the governed are usurpations. Such reflections as these were possible, as he saw it, to all
men, learned and unlearned, experienced or inexperienced, possessors of high intellectual gifts and those of the most limited
capacities. They required, furthermore, no knowledge of tradition and rested on no appeal to historical experience. Tradition,
as Paine saw it, was simply a formula to cover the injustices
which the ambition and greed of powerful men had brought
into the world. Tradition had better be forgotten. History was
the painful record of man's injustices to man. It should not be
consulted as a guide to the formation of political institutions.
We must, Paine wrote in one of his pamphl~ts, "think as though
we were the first men who ever thought."
What Paine and the many who agreed with him, at least in
his political theory, introduced into American thought was, then,
a contempt for tradition and history. Attacking Edmund Burke's
Reflections on the French Revolution, he decried the appeal to
historical precedent. Those who examine such precedents, he said,
trace a course backward from error to error and end in utter
confusion. They are fortunate if they do not end in utter wickedness. The notion that the ways of life mankind has painfully
worked out might with profit be examined by us now, and that
words of earnest and thoughtful men reflecting upon these matters might merit our'study, Paine dismissed with contempt.
A second amputation of the range of reasoned discourse may
be illustrated from the writings of so great a man as Benjamin
Franklin. Franklin was impatient with Paine's appeal to general

26

abstract principles. For him, the soundest lessons are those of
experience and history. The argument that taxation without representation was tyranny left him relatively cold. He preferred to
consult the more practical oracles of e~perience. Thus he found
no serious objection to the Stamp Tax when it was first proposed.
He argued for the right of Colonial legislatures to fix taxes on
the ground that when people have to bear burdens, experience
indicates they bear them more cheerfully when these burdens
are, or the people think they are, imposed on them by themselves. Franklin's confidence in the lessons of history is illustrated
in the plans he drew up for the curriculum of a new academy
he was instrumental in f-orming in Philadelphia. The core of the
curriculum was instruction in history. Ethics, citizenship, and
even the importance of religion were to be conveyed through
the channels of instruction in history.
In short, Franklin's position was the antithesis of Tom Paine's.
Distrusting the generalizations of abstract thought, he placed his
confidence on the particulars of experience or of history. In this
respect he was in harmony with the spirit of the developing new
sciences of the century. In the political sphere where experimentation is impossible equivalent progress toward truth might be
made through the analysis of historical experience. The consequence of such thinking was a dramatic reversal with respect
to what might be taken as demonstrably true.
This reversal may be seen by comparing the position which
so skeptical a philosopher as Hume took with the position we
commonly take today~ Hume pointed out that experience, and
this would include the lessons of history, can at best establish a
high degree of probability. That matters have proceeded in a
particular pattern time and again makes it highly likely that they
will so proceed in the future. But it makes it only highly likely
or highly probable. On the other hand, the analysis of abstract
ideas may give absolute demonstration. For example, that two
sides of a triangle must always in their combined length be great-
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er than the third side, or that a part must always be less than the
whole of which it is a part-these are absolute and incontrovertible truths. The mind cannot even conceive the contrary of these
propositions. The lines of reasoning in which they emerge must
thus constitute absolute demonstration. But the proposition that
the sun will rise tomorrow morning, which is based upon our
experience of many such risings in the past, can be at best only
probable, though highly probable indeed. The mind can conceive
of the failure of the sun to rise. Now in this point of view abstract
reasoning produces absolute dem~nstration, while the most careful experimentation and the shrewdest analysis of history can indicate only the probable. Compare this with our own view of
these matters. We tend to suppose that general and abstract propositions are mere opinions and that science gives us the highest of
certainties. We owe this point of view in no small measure to
those men of the eighteenth century who like Franklin placed
little confidence in abstract generalizations but gave wholehearted
assent to the conclusions reached from the particulars of experience or of observation or of history.
A third strain of eighteenth-century thinking seems to bear
upon the accumulation of doubts about, reason and rational discourse which underlie the anti-intellectualism of our time. This
strain is best exemplified perhaps in such religious writers as the
Puritans Thomas Shepard and Jonathan Edwards. What troubled
Shepard and Edwards was the fact that men who seem fully
aware intellectually of the evils of sin and the dangers of eternal
damnation nevertheless persevered in their wicked courses. They
explained this fact by distinguishing between two kinds of ideasnotional ideas and real ideas. Thomas Shepard illustrated the point
by describing the difference of our reaction to the sight of a lion
painted on the wall and represented in the act of leaping toward
us with foaming jaws, as contrasted with our reaction to a real
lion. In the one case, he pointed out, though we see the details
of the lion clearly, our feelings are not involved. In the other, we
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are deeply disturbed in our emotions. Now, the tendency of this
line of thinking is to conclude that it is the emotional element in
thought rather than its clarity or precision, its logical cogency
and conclusiveness, which is most significant. A man is saved, according to Edwards, not because he entertains true ideas, for even
the devil knows the truth, but because he has acquired what Edwards called "a relish" for the truth. Putting it another way,
Edwards insisted that truth must be not merely a possession of
the mind but a state of the soul. In God's Elect the whole being,
not merely the intellectual faculties, is involved.
It is but a step, not a very long one, from this view to the
position that it is not ideas but feelings or attitudes which matter.
If the theological commitments of the position are stripped away,
the position becomes very modern indeed. I' need only, I think,
appeal to your own observations and reflections to establish the
length to which dependence upon feeling, emotion, or attitude
takes precedence in our time over dependence upon the processes
of reasoned thought.
Tom Paine was. confident of the processes of abstract thought
and contemptuous of tradition and history. Franklin was confident of the illumination experience in history could provide and
contemptuous· of abstract generalizations. Men like Shepard and
Edwards opened the way at least to contempt for both abstract
thinking and the analysis of history and experience and to the
placing of dependence upon right feelings, right emotions, right
attitudes, in short, upon something other than the processes of
thought. One way of stating our present difficulties about reasonable and reasoned attempts to resolve political and philosophical
questions is to suggest that we suffer from the accumulation of
the negatives of these strains of our tradition. We accept disdain
for abstract thought, which we see not as demonstrative reasoning but as personal opinion or whim. We accept contempt for
historical precedents, which in our assurance about progress we
accept as naive or corrupt aspects of an outworn past. We accept
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judgments of the futility of reason giving weight instead to attitudes and interests and counting upon advertising and public
relations operating in an atmosphere of conformity to produce
consensus.
Abstract thought and the principles emerging from it can easily
be dismissed as personal opinion or prejudice. If we tum from
these uncertain foundations to the collection of data from experience or from history, we are troubled by the reflection that
the selection and ordering of these data may be the result only
of the particular attitudes or feelings or prejudices we entertain.
Our attitudes and feelings, moreover, seem to be merely expressions of our early conditioning or of our special economic or
social interests. In short, there seems to be no way in which anything generally conclusive can be grasped. What appears to be
so, whether as a result of abstract thought or of application to
experience, may be merely an accident of our emotional history
or a product of our emotional state.
The processes of discussion, then, involve merely the exchange
of opinion or the clash of prejudices and interests. Agreement,
consensus, and concurrence in action can be achieved only by
propaganda devices, and since the differences of propagandists
cannot ultimately be resolved, agreement can be reached only by
gaining control of the instruments of propaganda. The only ways
to accomplish this is by super propaganda or physical violence.
Consequences of these developments are everywhere evident.
They may be seen in the curricula of educational institutions.
They are all too manifest in the behavior of political parties and
of ambitious politicians. They deeply affect our religious life.
The state of mind I Have been describing accounts, I believe,
in large part for the confusion and anxiety of our times. Lacking
confidence in' the tradition of reasoned discourse on which our
political institutions and, indeed, our whole way of life was
founded, we view the future with uncertainty and foreboding.
If I am at all right in this analysis, the road to the recovery of
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health, not only for America but for Western civilization, seems
clear. We need to think as hard and deeply as we can. We need
rigorous, systematic, and sustained discussion of the basic issues
of our time. We need to clarify our general ideas, to arrange
them systematically, and to eliminate as far as possible the contradictions we entertain. We need to study our traditions and reexamine history as carefully as we can. We may be confident, I
believe, that hard and persistent thought will establish confidence
in the products of reason and that full and free discussion will
lead us step by step into at least approximations of truth about
the nature of things. The truths which may emerge will surely be
more than merely notional ideas. They will establish a fixed residence not only in the mind but in the soul, and so established
will be inextricably connected with our emotions and our wills.
This road to recovery is not an easy one. It is stony and difficult and uphill. But it does lead upward. Granting that it will not
be easy, I can only conclude by saying that the excellence of
democracy is not that it is the easiest way of life, but that it is
incomparably the best.
0
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